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Biomedical Devices and Systems Security
Abstract
Medical devices have been changing in revolutionary ways in recent years. One is in their form-factor.
Increasing miniaturization of medical devices has made them wearable, light-weight, and ubiquitous; they are
available for continuous care and not restricted to clinical settings. Further, devices are increasingly becoming
connected to external entities through both wired and wireless channels. These two developments have
tremendous potential to make healthcare accessible to everyone and reduce costs. However, they also provide
increased opportunity for technology savvy criminals to exploit them for fun and profit. Consequently, it is
essential to consider medical device security issues.
In this paper, we focused on the challenges involved in securing networked medical devices. We provide an
overview of a generic networked medical device system model, a comprehensive attack and adversary model,
and describe some of the challenges present in building security solutions to manage the attacks. Finally, we
provide an overview of two areas of research that we believe will be crucial for making medical device system
security solutions more viable in the long run: forensic data logging, and building security assurance cases.
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Abstract— Medical devices have been changing in revolution-
ary ways in recent years. One is in their form-factor. Increasing
miniaturization of medical devices has made them wearable,
light-weight, and ubiquitous; they are available for continuous
care and not restricted to clinical settings. Further, devices are
increasingly becoming connected to external entities through
both wired and wireless channels. These two developments
have tremendous potential to make healthcare accessible to
everyone and reduce costs. However, they also provide increased
opportunity for technology savvy criminals to exploit them for
fun and profit. Consequently, it is essential to consider medical
device security issues.
In this paper, we focused on the challenges involved in
securing networked medical devices. We provide an overview
of a generic networked medical device system model, a com-
prehensive attack and adversary model, and describe some of
the challenges present in building security solutions to manage
the attacks. Finally, we provide an overview of two areas of
research that we believe will be crucial for making medical
device system security solutions more viable in the long run:
forensic data logging, and building security assurance cases.
I. INTRODUCTION
Medical devices are articles that are used in the diagnosis
of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation,
treatment, or prevention of disease in humans or animals [1].
They are essential for modern medicine as they provide the
ability to automate many patient monitoring and management
functions. This allows caregivers (doctors/nurses) to be able
to focus on their primary task of patient care.
As medical devices collect and exchange personal health
data, securing them is very important. Lack of security
may not only lead to loss of patients’ privacy, but may
also physically harm the patient by allowing adversaries
to introduce bogus data or modifying/suppressing legitimate
data, inducing erroneous diagnosis. Indeed, protecting health
data is a legal requirement as well. The Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), speci-
fies, among other things, a series of administrative, technical,
and physical security procedures for covered entities to use
to assure the confidentiality of electronic protected health
information [2].
Medical devices can be broadly classified into two cat-
egories: stand-alone and interoperable. Stand-alone medical
devices are designed to perform monitoring and actuation
tasks without directly interacting with other medical devices
or other equipment. These are by far the most common type
of medical devices available today. Recent years, however,
have seen medical devices move away from their traditional
stand-alone organization. Devices now have considerable
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communication capabilities, which allows them to interact
with entities around them. The proliferation of short distance
wireless communication technologies has also opened up the
possibility for the devices to communicate using the wireless
channel. Examples include wireless pulse oximeters [3],
defibrillators and pacemakers [4], and patient monitors [5].
Note that, interactions between devices can be both in-
termittent (e.g. store and forward ECG monitors [6]) and
continuous in nature [5]. Each presents its own set of security
and privacy issues. In this paper, our focus is on networked
devices with continuous connectivity.
Both stand-alone and networked medical devices present
security problems. In the case of the former, devices may be
subject to tampering, reprogramming by unauthorized per-
sons, and device-specific hazards. Device firmware may be
upgraded opening additional hazards. When medical devices
are connected to a network, the network interface provides
another avenue for attack. It enables remote attacks from
outside the hospital as well as attacks that originate locally.
For example, researchers working with an implantable car-
diac defibrillator were able to remotely read telemetry data
and reprogram the device [7]. It can be seen that besides the
obvious physical hazards, there are also privacy implications
for such attacks. The network itself may also be a target
of attacks, and the more devices there are on the Hospital
Information System (HIS), the more attractive it is as a target.
Besides malicious attacks, there are also likely to be
unexpected interactions between devices and systems. Wire-
less technologies such as WiFi are particularly prone to
interference, including interference from medical devices
such as electro-surgical units, and invite tampering simply
by making it easier for malicious persons inside or outside
the hospital to access the network. Many of these devices
currently have no safeguards beyond an unpublished, propri-
etary interface and are susceptible to buffer overflows and
other problems when unexpected signals are received on
their interfaces. For example, electromagnetic interference
by two RFID systems (active and passive) in the proximity
of medical devices demonstrated the presence of hazards
such as: total switch-off and change in set ventilation rate of
mechanical ventilators; complete stoppage of syringe pumps;
malfunction of external pacemakers; complete stoppage of
renal replacement devices and so on [8].
In this paper, we present an overview of some of the
principal aspects of medical device security, especially when
the devices are networked. Particularly, the focus is on
identifying security requirements, the principal threats and
the challenges involved in addressing them. In [9], the
authors present a taxonomy of vulnerabilities of implantable
medical devices. They classify them based on the cause of
vulnerabilities and the effect the vulnerabilities have on the
system. In this work, we look at a much broader class of
medical devices. The focus is not only attack models, but
also on a model for networked medical devices, along with
the challenges involved in securing this model. Further, we
motivate the need for two new areas of research — forensic
data logging and assurance cases for security, that will nicely
complement the aforementioned security improvements that
are already being proposed with respect to medical devices.
II. MEDICAL DEVICE SYSTEM MODEL
Figure 1 depicts the patient-centric medical device sys-
tem. The model is based on the ICE standard for medical
device interoperability [10]. It has been designed to act
as a middleware enabling interaction of legacy stand-alone
medical devices and an architecture for applications using
medical devices, including closed-loop physiological control.
The system consists of: (1) Collection of Medical and Other
Devices placed on or around a single patient that can perform
monitoring and actuation. The devices have an adapter that
allows them to communicate with the Network Controller;
(2) Network Controller interfaces with the medical devices. It
is responsible for collecting data from the individual devices.
It also connects the entire setup to an external network, e.g.,
HIS. The network controller also records all the actions of the
entire system in a data logger or black box recorder (BBR)
for future analysis; (3) Supervisor receives data from the var-
ious medical devices, process it, and initiate action from the
medical devices. The Supervisor runs clinical applications
that use the connected devices to support a clinical scenario
selected by the caregiver; and (4) Caregiver is responsible
for configuring the system, selecting an appropriate program
on the Supervisor, and then monitoring the patient’s well-
being using an user-interface provided by the Supervisor. The
caregiver can control various parameters of the system such
as alarm thresholds and so on as permitted by the application
they choose.
The entire system is designed to facilitate interaction
between the medical devices available today. It has the
potential to provide closed-loop control over patient’s health.
For example, the Supervisor could run an application that
receives data from a glucose monitor, processes the data to
analyze the level of blood sugar in the patient, and commands
the infusion pump to administer a dose of insulin chosen by
the caregiver.
III. ATTACK MODEL
Adversaries attacking a medical device system, such as
that of Figure 1, can be classified into two sources: active
and passive. Active attackers have the capability to eavesdrop
on traffic between the devices, network controller and the
supervisor, inject messages, replay old messages, spoof, and
ultimately compromise the integrity of device operation.
Active attackers, if successful, can not only invade a patient’s
privacy but can also suppress legitimate data or insert bogus
data into the network leading to unwanted actions (drug
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Fig. 1. Patient-centric view of the device environment
case of an emergency). Passive attackers, on the other hand,
are attackers who eavesdrop on the messages exchanged
within the system and use off-line cryptanalytic attacks to
access confidential data being communicated (invading a
patient’s privacy). This type of attack does not try to interfere
with the operation of the medical devices.
There are four broad classes of targets that adversaries
can choose to attack within medical device systems. They
include: patient physical security, patient data security or
privacy, medical device physical security, and data security
of the health-care institution that deploys the medical device
system. We now describe them in some detail.
Patient’s Physical Security: This category includes attacks
that directly target the patient’s health. The attacker’s goal is
to cause some form of physical harm to the patient. This
can be achieved by targeting various operational aspects
of the medical device system such as sensing, processing,
communication, and actuation. Sample attacks include: (1)
triggering a device to give an additional dose of medication;
(2) altering programming of a radiation therapy device,
either by corrupting its program directly or by feeding
it bad data; (3) interfering with an implanted device; (4)
falsifying printed labels on medication between the pharmacy
and the patient; (5) tampering with a patient’s electronic
health records to make it appear that they have- or do not
have- a medical condition; (6) changing prescriptions in the
hospital’s order entry system so the patient receives the
wrong dose or medication
Patient’s Data Security: This category includes attacks
that seek to access an individual patient’s health data in
an unauthorized manner. The issue with such an attack
is that such loss of sensitive medical information could
lead to discrimination and abuse. For instance, one could
deny services to people with specific medical conditions.
Patient’s data security can be breached in multiple ways from
communication eavesdropping, to physical theft of patient
information. Sample attacks include: (1) reading residual
device data if not cleared after use; (2) a patient’s health
records are read by curious hospital staff; and (3) medical
records are stolen and used to file a fake insurance claim.
This category involves security of a single patient. The
privacy of data pertaining to sets of patients is considered
under institutional security.
Medical Device Physical Security: This category includes
attacks that seek to target medical devices and the network
components. The idea is to mount a Denial of Service (DoS)
on the medical devices in some form so that they cannot
perform their task. Such attacks could have additional con-
sequences apart from lack of availability including privacy
loss, especially in systems designed to fail-open [11], or even
physical damage to the device or surrounding infrastructure.
Sample attacks include: (1) theft of devices or medication;
(2) new firmware is uploaded to infusion pumps using their
online update feature that changes the pressure limits causing
the pumps to burn out their motors; and (3) a device is
engaged in an endless stream of challenge-response message
to drain its battery.
Institutional Data Security & Privacy: This category in-
cludes attacks that seek to target the medical institution
where the medical device system is deployed. The idea is to
compromise the interaction between the device system and
the medical institution’s internal network and access, at a
large-scale, patient data or network operational information.
Samples attacks include: (1) traffic analysis of the hospital
network reveals that patients have a high rate of adverse
events; (2) sniffing the wireless network shows that one
brand of device is prone to problems; (3) DOS attack on
hospital network; and (4) changing the hospital’s Dose Error
Reduction System information to trigger incorrect alarms.
IV. CHALLENGES
There are numerous challenges that need to be overcome
in the course of developing solutions for addressing the
various attacks on medical device systems. They are:
• Overhead: Security always adds an overhead to any
system. Medical devices often have limited computa-
tional and communication capabilities. Many devices
are battery powered. Even devices such as infusion
pumps or ventilators include batteries as a backup
source or for use during patient transport. Security solu-
tions that are resource-intensive will seldom be adopted.
Therefore computation, memory, and communication
resource needs must be carefully considered.
• Heterogeneity: Systems of medical device are usually
made up of heterogeneous elements with order of mag-
nitude difference in capabilities. A direct consequence
of this heterogeneity is that one security solution might
not fit the needs of the entire system.
• Usability: Security protocols need to be developed with
usability in mind. That is, they should in not increase
the cognitive load of the users beyond what is needed
in learning to operate the device. Essentially, security
has to be as transparent as possible to the users (e.g.,
clinicians). Clinical trials apart from testing devices for
efficacy should also test them for the usability aspect of
their security. Security solutions that add overhead for
clinicians, such as multiple logins or the need to enter a
code on each device create safety issues for patients. In
many clinical situations, speed is important and systems
that delay clinicians’ ability to act will not be clinically
acceptable.
• Attitude: A prevailing attitude in medical device sys-
tems community is that of “security through obscurity”
[12]. This attitude has been shown to be problematic
as hackers, given the right incentives, will always be
able to hack into such a system. Further, making the
inner workings of the security primitives of the system
publicly available, leads to design improvements that
serve the system well, in the long run [13].
• Safety: Safety has been the primary concern for med-
ical devices for a long time. With the introduction of
security, one needs to ensure that system safety does
not get compromised in any manner. For example, the
addition of cryptographic primitives to a implantable
device if not designed properly could lead to exces-
sive computational load causing excessive heating of
the tissue surrounding the device or premature battery
exhaustion.
V. DEVELOPING SECURE MEDICAL DEVICES
Safety has been the fundamental goal of medical device
manufacturers. This has lead to the development of a process
for ensuring safety properties using tools such as: (1) FMEA:
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, and (2) Safety/assurance
cases. Manufacturers must convince the FDA that they have
accounted for and mitigated all safety hazards. Safety in the
context of security is a growing issue; driven in part by the
use of wireless technology. Device manufacturers must now
explicitly address these concerns in their submission to the
FDA.
Maintaining security for medical devices is not very dif-
ferent from any other cyber-physical system and depends
on the maintenance of five basic properties - (1) Data
Integrity: All information generated and exchanged between
the medical devices and the supervisor are accurate and
complete without any alterations; (2) Data Confidentiality:
All information generated during the use of medical devices
is only disclosed to those who are authorized to see it; (3)
Availability: All medical devices are accessible by the super-
visor, caregivers and patients as needed; (4) Authentication:
All devices involved know who they are interacting with; and
(5) Physical/Administrative Security: All medical devices and
associated equipment used by caregivers and others should
be protected from tampering. Further, the work-flow of an
organization should allow only authorized physical access to
equipment.
Recent years have seen much work in securing medical
devices [11], [7], [14], [15]. In most of these cases the
focus is on secure communication or effective access control,
especially for implantable medical devices. Many of the
issues discussed in these papers apply to general classes of
medical devices as well. In this section, therefore, we provide
an overview of two areas of research that we believe will
be crucial for building secure medical devices. The first is
forensic data logging capabilities and the other is developing
formal assurance cases for medical device security.
Forensic Data Logging: Forensic data logging means that
patient and device data are logged to a flight-recorder style
data logger. These logs assist in uncovering causes of adverse
events. They can help to distinguish use error, equipment
failure, or abnormal use. Logs also open new hazards. The
data logging of the state-of-the-clinical environment usually
includes, among other things: (1) technical variables and
technical alarm conditions from the medical devices made
available to the ICE network controller; (2) patient physio-
logical variables and alarm conditions from medical devices
available to the network controller; (3) network controller
commands to medical devices; (4) network controller status;
(5) supervisor decisions, time the decisions were made and
the inputs on which they were made; and (6) any other
significant events and errors within the entire system. Fun-
damentally, data logger designs need to anticipate security
risks. For example, data logger memory should be write-
only on the device and information identifying the patient
encrypted.
Assurance Cases: Assurance cases represent a framework
for arguing that evidence justifies a claim. They provide a
means for convincing a third party, such as a regulator, that
a particular claim is justified. For medical device security,
one might claim that the device is adequately secure for
its intended use in a particular use environment. Developing
assurance cases like their safety counterpart is a three step
process: (1) Claim: Specifying the claims about certain prop-
erties of the system. For example, communication between
devices and the network controller is secure; (2) Argument:
Making arguments about the evidence justifying the claim.
Example, use of AES encryption algorithm for hiding (i.e.,
encrypting) data communicated between the device and
network controller; and (3) Evidence: Providing evidence
to support the arguments made toward the claim. Example,
AES algorithm implementation is verified via formal proof
documentation or reasoned test cases that are verified via
documentation.
Complementary hazard analysis techniques (e.g. FTA,
FMEA, Hazop, etc) in combination with formal methods
techniques for verifying implementations facilitates the de-
velopment of secure medical devices and provides a foun-
dation for assurance case presentation. Building assurance
cases for individual components of the medical device system
is not sufficient. Eventually, the individual assurance cases
have to be composed as well, to satisfy security claims of
the entire system. Finally, developing assurance cases also
involves providing cost-benefit justification for their use.
Some of the questions that need addressing in this regard
include: how much additional effort is required? Is the effort
justified? What are the short and long term benefits from
the activity? How are safety cases maintained as systems
evolve?
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Security is crucial for the long term viability of today’s
networked medical device systems. In this paper, we focused
on the challenges involved in securing networked medical
devices in the presence of various classes of adversaries.
We presented a generic model for medical device systems,
developed a comprehensive attack and adversary model,
and described the various challenges in designing security
solutions. Further, we provided a short overview of two main
areas of research that need to be done to make security
solutions more viable in the medical settings. It needs to be
noted that security can only be talked about in abstract absent
a concrete design. In the future, we therefore plan to focus on
developing security solutions for specific clinical applications
such as pulmonary management work-flows that involve
integrating devices including ventilators, pulse oximeters,
blood pressure monitors, and so on. Validation will be done
based on actual implementation of the solution in the context
of the clinical application.
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